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i . “We  l i v e  our  true  l i v es  in  s igns  and  f i gures .” ( r i l ke )
Rilke begins the 11th of his Sonnets to Orpheus (Sonette an Orpheus), 
published in 1922, with a question: “SEE the night­sky. Is no 
constellation / called ‘The Horseman’?” 1 The answer is no. If, 
however, there were a constellation by this name, it would not 
change the meaning of the final tercet: “Even stellar likenesses 
deceive. / Still, let us enjoy a while believing / in the figure. For 
that suffices.” 2 Here we are presented with a paradox: the know­
ledge that constellations are nothing but projections of earthly 
figures onto the heavens is none the less a source of pride and 
joy. Consequently, the 12th sonnet honours the human capacity 
for making figures and living in figures: “HAIL to the spirit who 
has power to bind us; / for we live our true lives in signs and figu­
res.” 3 It is the ‘living in figures’ here that is crucial, the culturally 
enduring practice of a relational sense that is no longer depen­
dent on absolute truths, as the opening line of the second quartet 
declares: “Without knowing our true place in things, / we still 
act in real interrelations.” 4 This marks an epistemological turn 
in Rilke that is typical of modernity: the renunciation of Occi­
dental culture’s grands récits. He states the principle: “In place of 
	 1 “SIEH den Himmel. Heißt kein Sternbild ‘Reiter’?” All translations 
of German poets or philosophers in the following are by Anthony 
Stephens (Sydney), except when otherwise specified. I am also indebt­
ed to Anthony Stephens and Patrick Hohlweck (Cologne) for reviewing 
the english version of my essay which was published first in German 
(see Blamberger 2011b).
	 2 “Auch die sternische Verbindung trügt. / Doch uns freue eine Weile 
nun / der Figur zu glauben. Das genügt.” 
	 3 “HEIL dem Geist, der uns verbinden mag; / denn wir leben wahrhaft in 
Figuren.”
	 4 “Ohne unsern wahren Platz zu kennen, / handeln wir aus wirklichem 
Bezug.” (Rilke 1975, vol. 2, 737 f.).
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 possessing we learn interrelation”.5 This begs the question whet­
her an unlearning is also called for – an unlearning precisely of 
the images and figures that once had a ‘true place’ in our cultural 
tradition. Rilke’s novel The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (Die 
Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge), first published in 1910, 
suggests precisely this. When Malte, Rilke’s alter ego, looks at a 
dying man in a crémerie, he is seized by a “nameless fear”. This 
fear of death can no longer be named. After the abandonment of 
old religious models of interpreting death there are no familiar 
images which might transform it into mere fright. It seems every 
poet must henceforth seek new models and images for represen­
ting and interpreting death, with personal but no longer general 
validity.6 “I would so much like to stay amongst the meanings 
grown dear to me”, Rilke’s protagonist confesses, and yet he is 
consistent in longing for a time of a “different interpretation”, a 
time once more beyond subjectivity, a time of new meanings and 
new images, new words, not spoken or written by himself: “And 
in this time it is I who will be written”.7
In a postmodern view on modernism, this hope itself ap­
pears in retrospect as a remnant of a metaphysical mind­set. It 
is remarkable, however, that the loss of the old religous concepts 
of death and the loss of an emphatic idea of the beyond does 
not discredit the interpretative potential and the aesthetic dig­
nity of older, historically framed images of death. Today, the old 
Christian allegory of death, the skeleton with its scythe, still ap­
pears in films and novels, as does also the far less frightening 
figure of sleep as a relative of death. The Enlightenment author 
Lessing had already attempted to do away with the Christian, 
strongly medieval bugbear, as it spoiled all joy in the here and 
now – modernist authors such as Rilke, Benn, or Kafka then 
	 5 “[S]tatt des Besitzes erlernt man den Bezug”. (Rilke 1966, 820). For the 
quotation’s context cf. Fülleborn 1995.
	 6 On representations of death in modern literature see also Blamberger 
1997 and Blamberger 2002.
	 7 “Ich würde so gerne unter den Bedeutungen bleiben, die mir lieb ge­
worden sind […]. Die Zeit der anderen Auslegung wird anbrechen [...]. 
Aber diesmal werde ich geschrieben werden.” (Rilke 1975, vol. 11, 755 f.).
implemented a terrifying imagery of death opposed to Lessing’s 
phantasm of a Hellenistic, serene passing that penetrated the 
beautiful veil separating art from life. Despite all discussion of a 
radical break from tradition, the old images of death lived on in 
literature, art and film, and continue to do so. This, I will argue, 
is neither a specific quality of death­images nor of an appropria­
tive art incapable of innovation in postmodernism. Rather, the 
lasting power of cultural figurations can be observed throughout 
all times and cultures. Unlike a history of technology and the 
sciences, in which the old is marked as the obsolete, a cultural 
history is not dominated by a principle of progress. 
Yet how is it possible to adhere to an established iconograph­
ic archive, when, at the same time, great difficulty arises if one 
wishes to “stay amongst the meanings” that were once included 
in these images, shaped their formal language and have become 
“dear”? A simple answer would be that current versions of tradi­
tional figurations, genealogically bound to past world views, have 
always inherent in them an index of transience, of loss and end­
ing, while at the same time making possible varieties of artistic 
play that bind individuals into communities. This is a melan­
choly argument and at best only a half­truth. Against this, one 
may assume that there is, firstly, always a margin between the 
figural and the discursive dimension of cultural artefacts and, 
secondly, that the reinvocation of the Old always gives rise to a 
germination of the New.
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i i . enHarmon ic  cHange  and  a es tHe t i c  i dea  
( tHomas  mann , k ant )
In order to analyse the relation between the figural and discursive 
dimensions, the tension between thinking and imaging in cul­
tural artefacts, I will cite another image of death. It comes from 
Thomas Mann’s novel Der Zauberberg (The Magic Mountain) that 
first appeared in 1924. The protagonist Hans Castorp is shown an 
x­ray of his cousin’s diseased lungs, in which he observes:
“Joachim’s death­like form and necrotic skeleton […], 
this bare frame and spindly Memento. He was filled with 
awe and terror. ‘Yes, yes, I see’, he repeated. ‘My god, I 
see!’ [...] Hans Castorp now saw the good Joachim in this 
way — albeit with the help and at the instigation of physi­
cal and optical science — so that it had no significance 
and everything was in order.” 8
This Christian, medieval allegory of death is cited here, death as 
the skeletal figure who takes his victims for all the world to see, 
reminding the living of the transience and non­actuality of their 
earthly existence. Mann mentions the “Memento [mori]” only to 
have the narrator promptly deny the evoked associations: We 
are not in the Middle Ages, but instead attending an event of 
“physical and optical science”. According to him, the scene the­
refore is “of no significance” to an enlightened person. Thomas 
Mann’s image of death is deeply ambiguous, despite its preser­
ving the traditional figure of the Grim Reaper. He attempts to 
illustrate this interplay of figural constancy and discursive varia­
	 8 “Joachims Grabsgestalt und Totenbein […], dies kahle Gerüst und spin­
deldürre Memento. Andacht und Schrecken erfüllten ihn. ‘Jawohl, 
jawohl, ich sehe’, sagte er mehrmals. ‘Mein Gott, ich sehe!’ [...] So 
sah nun Hans Castorp den guten Joachim, wenn auch mit Hilfe und 
auf Veranstaltung der physikalisch­optischen Wissenschaft, so daß es 
nichts zu bedeuten hatte und alles mit rechten Dingen zuging.” (Mann 
1974, vol. 3, 305).
bility by way of a musical figure’s tilting or switching (Kippfigur), 
the principle of black (piano) keys, enharmonic change or shifting 
( enharmonische Verwechslung). In his novel Doktor Faustus of 1947, 
the composer Adrian Leverkühn explains to his friend Zeitblom: 
“Relation is everything. And if you wish to give it a name, 
it would be ‘ambiguity’. […] Take this note or this one. 
You can understand it in this way or in that way — you 
can regard it as raised from below or lowered from above 
and you can, if you’re smart, make use of the double 
sense in any way.” 9
A single black key on a piano can at the same time be ‘F sharp’ 
or ‘G flat’; the note can be reinterpreted, be assigned a different 
tonal context and a different function, thus allowing a change of 
key (Tonartwechsel). The death image of Magic Mountain can be 
read with the same ambiguity, as the lowering of a higher meta­
physical meaning or as the heightening and idealisation (Verklä-
rung, Überhöhung) of events “of the physical and optical science” 
that, possibly, are really of “no [metaphysical] significance”. This, 
however, is no mere artistic play in the sense of a transposed 
principle of enharmonic change from music to the literary field, 
so as to freely oscillate between theological and medical notions 
of death. Rather, it bears witnesss to the fundamental potential 
of cultural artefacts to not only form and retain a given age’s his­
torical knowledge in concrete figurations, but also, as recurring 
forms, to be open to reformulation. Accordingly, even outmo­
ded allegories of death may retain productive potential, and such 
puzzle pictures (Vexierbilder) are not exclusive to Thomas Mann. 
	 9 “Beziehung ist alles. Und willst du sie bei Namen nennen, so ist ihr 
Name ‘Zweideutigkeit’. […] Nimm den Ton oder den. Du kannst ihn so 
verstehen oder beziehungsweise auch so, kannst ihn als erhöht auffas­
sen von unten oder als vermindert von oben und kannst dir, wenn du 
schlau bist, den Doppelsinn beliebig zu nutze machen.” (Mann 1974, 
vol. 6, 66).
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He simply draws on the basic ambiguity of all figurations, whet­
her literary, musical or pictorial. 
This relation between the figural and discursive dimensions 
of cultural artefacts, demonstrated from Mann’s Magic Mountain 
as only one possible source, can be described more accurately 
with the help of Kant’s concept of the aesthetic idea (ästhetische 
Idee). According to Kant imagination (Einbildungskraft) is a pro­
ductive faculty of an artist or writer, a power of forming an image, 
and an “aesthetic idea” is a “representation of the imagination 
which stimulates much thought, yet without the possibility of 
any definite thought’s, that is: any concept’s being adequate to 
it; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made 
intelligible by language”. This is “a counterpart to a rational idea, 
a concept to which no intuition or representation of the imagina­
tion can be adequate”. According to Kant, the “aesthetic idea” 
will never have solely “logical attributes”, but always “aesthetic 
attributes” as well, “opening [...] the prospect onto an illimitable 
field of related mental images”. We are thus not to understand the 
“aesthetic idea” as static or crystallized, but rather as in constant 
flux, as a dynamic network of relations. Kant applies his concept 
of the “aesthetic idea”, as a “representation of the imagination” to 
pictorial, sculptural and poetic artefacts, which are not only rep­
resentations of experience, but themselves modes of experience. 
They do not simply record conceptual knowledge, but continually 
create new knowledge. Such aesthetic ideas, becoming manifest 
as “representation” (Darstellung), that is: in concrete forms give 
rise to the “multiplicity” of “partial representations” and thus 
“activate the potential of intellectual ideas (reason)”.10 As a com­
	 10 “Unter einer ästhetischen Idee verstehe ich diejenige Vorstellung der 
Einbildungskraft, die viel zu denken veranlaßt, ohne daß ihr doch ein 
bestimmter Gedanke, d. i. Begriff adäquat sein kann, die folglich keine 
Sprache völlig erreicht und verständlich machen kann. – Man sieht 
leicht, daß sie das Gegenstück (Pendant) von einer Vernunftidee sei, 
welche umgekehrt ein Begriff ist, dem keine Anschauung (Vorstellung 
der Einbildungskraft) adäquat sein kann.” – [Die] “ästhetische Idee” 
[enthält nie allein] “logische Attribute”, [sondern ebenso] “ästhetische 
Attribute”, [die] “die Aussicht in ein unabsehliches Feld verwandter 
plement to this, I would add that the same principle applies not 
only to the production of an artwork, as Kant argues, but also to 
its reception. Expanding Kant’s concept of the “aesthetic idea”, 
we may develop a theory of the relation between thinking and 
imaging and a theory of the impact of cultural figurations with 
the following six aspects:
1) Kant’s conception of the aesthetic idea remains on the level 
of consciousness because it is a representation of some­
thing imagined. In terms of current media theory we must 
add that an aesthetic idea is — in production and recep­
tion — dependent on both medium and material. There 
is a reciprocal relationship between an aesthetic idea and 
an artefact’s concrete form. The Greek word for this is 
 mórphoma (Gestaltgebung).
2) By necessity, an aesthetic idea is genealogically bound to 
artefacts — not just originally or uniquely, but again and 
again. In other words, aesthetic ideas can develop only by 
means of concrete artefacts; they cannot, however, mani­
fest themselves purely in theoretical concepts. Therefore 
aesthetic ideas can only be transmitted and passed on by 
means of concrete artefacts. 
3) The ability to perceive and recognise an aesthetic idea 
depends on the concrete shape of an artefact, but is not 
bound to one and the same artefact or medium. The figu­
ration of death as a skeleton may be presented in copper 
engravings, choreographies, paintings, poems or films. 
4) Concerning the transmission of aesthetic ideas, one should 
distinguish between the virtual “multiplicity of partial 
representations” (Mannigfaltigkeit der Teilvorstellungen) 
and their selective actualisations. The actualisation of a 
“partial representation” will commonly suffice for it to 
Vorstellungen eröffne[n]”. – [Die ästhetischen Ideen provozieren qua] 
“Darstellung” [eine] “Mannigfaltigkeit der Teilvorstellungen” [und 
bringen dadurch] “das Vermögen intellektueller Ideen (die Vernunft) 
in Bewegung”. (Kant 1983, vol.8, 413–416). 
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be  recognisable. In Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain, the 
mention of a Grim Reaper is enough to evoke the medieval 
image of death — the scythe is not needed as an attribute. 
5) Insofar as aesthetic ideas cannot be subsumed under a 
“definite thought”, notion or “concept” already available to 
us, they paradoxically activate “the potential of intellectual 
ideas (reason)” throughout the ages. They are, thus, fun­
damentally open to reformulation, regardless of whether in 
relation to the initial artefact or to new ones in which the 
aesthetic idea is manifest. Furthermore: according to Kant, 
theoretical concepts are “enlarged aesthetically”. The “rep­
resentation of the imagination” initiated by artistic shaping 
is “creative”, insofar as it enlarges what we may think and 
know.11 In this way, aesthetic innovation and the progress 
of knowledge are linked. More succinctly, it could be put 
thus: in tradition, in the passing on of aesthetic ideas in ar­
tefacts, there is an interplay of assignment of signification 
and its suspension, as there is one of gain and loss of form.
6) The death image in Magic Mountain evokes both the old 
theological discourse of death as it also does the new medi­
cal one, instead of simply replacing one by the other. More 
generally, this means that in concrete artefacts, past, pres­
ent and future — virtuality, actuality and potential new 
virtuality — blend in with each other, encompassing both 
“logical” as well as “aesthetic” attributes.
	 11 [Indem sie] “den Begriff selbst auf unbegrenzte Art ästhetisch erweitert 
[…] ist die Einbildungskraft hiebei schöpferisch” (Kant 1983, vol. 8, 415).
i i i . morpHomata  —   a  manual
Form-Giving (Gestaltgebung) stand in mutual reference to aesthetic 
ideas; the taking shape of artefacts of wholly diverging material­
ities and medialities has a lasting quality. The ancient Greek term 
for Gestaltwerdungen, Gestaltbildungen or Gestaltgebungen is morphó-
mata. It is a fitting name for an International Centre for Advan­
ced Studies in the Humanities in Cologne that sets out to analyse 
aesthetic ideas of lasting cultural impact. Morphomata means the 
interrelation between thinking and imaging in the formation of aesthetic 
ideas, the interrelation between the formative forces of the ima gi na tion 
and the form-giving material or medium. As a scholarly term, how­
ever, morphómata is a neologism that requires some explanation, 
whereas concept­formation can only ever result from deductive 
and constructive processes. Any concept­realism would be out of 
place. If, in the following, it is suggested that we understand mor-
phómata, or “morphomes”, as Gestaltgebungen of lasting cultural 
impact, this is not to say that morphomes have a tangible exis­
tence, but that artefacts, in their taking shape, can be approached 
as morphomes. The term “morphome” does not designate a cata­
logue of characteristics for a classificatory connection of artefacts 
in the sense of a historical or systematic rubric, as is familiar 
from concepts of genre, as for instance subsuming a number of 
texts under the heading novella. The term morphome rather pro­
vides a focus for a number of problems, with whose help artefacts 
of entirely different medial or material forms, of entirely diffe­
rent historical or cultural origins can be analysed. Thus not the 
individual artefact is to be termed morphomatic but rather the 
approach to it — the epistemic and practical value of which must 
be vindicated by each case study. 
A morphomatic approach is based on the assumption that 
a history of cultural knowledge is not congruent with a history 
of abstract concepts or “rational ideas”. It has long been a mat­
ter of course for cultural artefacts to be taken as recording the 
knowledge of present and past times, transforming them in the 
act of their concrete form­giving and creating a new knowledge 
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that is passed on to future times. Cultural Sciences (Kulturwissen-
schaften) have developed a number of effective concepts for this, 
which, from different disciplinary perspectives, accentuate the 
lasting power of artefacts that can no longer completely be cap­
tured by language. Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms, 
Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne­project, Erwin Panofsky’s iconology, 
Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorology, Gottfried Boehm’s image 
research or the concepts of Material Culture, New Historicism or 
Poetics of Culture are representative of this. While their basically 
Occidental provenance is problematic in global terms, the mor­
phomatic approach can only benefit from these theories – it is not 
conceived as standing in competition with them. The neologism 
of the morphome therefore claims no theoretical originality, but 
sets out to be a method of approach that is apt for an international 
research centre addressing the transmission of cultural knowl­
edge from a cross­cultural perspective. 
The main advantage of the neologism mórphoma is that this 
term can describe the formative force of cultural artefacts of all 
kinds, regardless of their medium, material, historical or cultural 
provenance. Other terms of image­making, such as allegory, sym­
bol or thought­image all have an historical bias that is determined 
or influenced by a long Western tradition. The term mórphoma 
is free of this burden — and this may perhaps help to facilitate 
a diplomatic cross­cultural approach, a dialogue of scholars of 
different cultures. This is quite exceptional in the Humanities 
whose definitions vary drastically throughout the various periods 
and cultural contexts. A German speaking of a symbol is most 
likely to recall Goethe’s definition, according to which the general 
is always already contained in the particular, the dove a symbol 
for peace, as it is, after all, a peaceful animal. A German would 
never think to take a set of traffic lights to be a symbol, unlike an 
American, for instance, for whom a symbol is simply a sign with 
a conventionalised meaning. However, if a Japanese, Mexican or 
Egyptian is to study an artefact of their own culture according to 
our approach, that is morphomatically, what is at stake will always 
be the verification that the taking shape has activated aesthetic 
ideas of a lasting cultural impact. Fundamentally, the approach 
is concerned with the analysis of the interrelation between the 
formative forces of imagination and the form­giving material or 
medium. 
The open concept of morphomes obviously also has some 
inherent disadvantages. Ancient Greek sculptures may just as well 
be subject to a morphomatic perspective as Aboriginal imagery 
or a poem by Goethe. The range of potential artefacts embodying 
a form-giving of lasting cultural impact, which a morphomaticist 
could refer to in order to discuss a historical development or a re­
gional – or national – diversification of aesthetic ideas, is stupen­
dous. The suspicion of hubris may well arise. The punishment 
might just be a Babylonian confusion of professional jargons in 
a discourse of disciplinary experts. Interdisciplinarity, however, 
necessarily presupposes discrete disciplines; specialist capacities 
can only be translated into general comprehensibility at the cost 
of dilettantism. Therefore, a research center such as Morphomata 
requires an ethics of communication that firstly accepts initial 
mis­ or non­understanding as the premise of understanding and 
secondly places emphasis on questions rather than answers. 
On point 1 above: Morphomatics must not understate the 
alien qualities of past times and different cultures or usurp the 
specialist language of a discipline. The societal relevance of mor­
phomatic discourse and studies lies in the explicit recognition 
that seemingly familiar instances of form-giving were, in the past, 
treated discursively in radically different ways. We should not be 
concerned with the discovery of a past modernity, but with the 
discovery of an outmodedness. Not an actualising interpretation 
of the past, but what Nietzsche once called a “cure of intellects” 
(“Cur der Geister”):
“Intellectual and Physical Transplantation as Remedies. — 
The different cultures are so many intellectual climates, 
every one of which is peculiarly harmful or beneficial to 
this or that organism. History as a whole, as the knowl­
edge of different cultures, is the science of remedies, but 
not the science of the healing art itself. We still need a 
physician who can make use of these remedies, in order 
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to send every one – temporarily or permanently – to that 
climate that just suits him. To live in the present, within 
the limits of a single culture, is insufficient as a univer­
sal remedy: too many highly useful kinds of men, who 
cannot breathe freely in this atmosphere, would perish. 
With the aid of history we must give them air and try 
to preserve them: even men of lower cultures have their 
value. — Add to this cure of intellects that humanity, 
on considerations of bodily health, must strive to dis­
cover by means of a medical geography what kinds of 
degeneration and disease are caused by each region of 
the earth, and conversely what ingredients of health the 
earth affords: and then, gradually, nations, families, and 
individuals must be transplanted long and permanently 
enough for them to become masters of their inherited 
physical infirmities. The whole world will finally be a 
series of sanatoria.” 12
	 12 “Geistige und leibliche Verpflanzung als Heilmittel. — Die verschiedenen Cul­
turen sind verschiedene geistige Klimata, von denen ein jedes diesem 
oder jenem Organismus vornehmlich schädlich oder heilsam ist. Die 
Historie im Ganzen, als das Wissen um die verschiedenen Culturen, ist 
die Heilmittellehre, nicht aber die Wissenschaft der Heilkunst selber. 
Der Arzt ist erst recht noch nöthig, der sich dieser Heilmittellehre be­
dient, um Jeden in sein ihm gerade erspriessliches Klima zu senden 
— zeitweilig oder auf immer. In der Gegenwart leben, innerhalb einer 
einzigen Cultur, genügt nicht als allgemeines Recept, dabei würden zu 
viele höchst nützliche Arten von Menschen aussterben, die in ihr nicht 
gesund athmen können. Mit der Historie muss man ihnen Luft machen 
und sie zu erhalten suchen; auch die Menschen zurückgebliebener Cul­
turen haben ihren Werth. — Dieser Cur der Geister steht zur Seite, dass 
die Menschheit in leiblicher Beziehung darnach streben muss, durch 
eine medicinische Geografie dahinterzukommen, zu welchen Entartun­
gen und Krankheiten jede Gegend der Erde Anlass giebt, und umge kehrt 
welche Heilfactoren sie bietet: und dann müssen allmählich Völker,  
Familien und Einzelne so lange und so anhaltend verpflanzt werden, bis 
man über die angeerbten physischen Gebrechen Herr geworden ist. Die 
ganze Erde wird endlich eine Summe von Gesundheits­Stationen sein.” 
(Friedrich Nietzsche: Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. Ein Buch für 
freie Geister. Zweiter Band. Zweite Abtheilung: Der Wanderer und sein 
Schatten 188. In: Nietzsche 1980, vol. 2, 634 / Nietzsche 1913, 204).
As a philosopher in the guise of a physician, Nietzsche rec­
ommends a “cure of intellects” whereby the voices of temporally 
or geographically distant cultures may liberate us from the con­
striction and one­dimensionality of the present and correct habit­
ual thought­images of our own time. The dead hold up a mirror 
to the living. We are, however, only able to experience what has 
through the passage of history become foreign to us within our 
own, Occidental culture, if we leave its foreignness intact, if we 
endure the differences and let them become productive. The same 
goes for a morphomatic approach to artefacts of other cultures 
in a synchronic comparison and for a comparison of disciplinary 
cultures. A diachronic, intercultural and interdisciplinary per­
spective, therefore, must be careful not to translate the foreign, or 
external, into its own realm, but to foster an understanding of the 
foreign by perceiving it as foreign. The aim is not to translate, but 
rather transpose into foreign shapes or forms, as Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe demanded in his concept of world literature, which 
he demonstrated in an exemplary way through the poems of the 
West-Eastern Divan (West-östlicher Diwan) in 1819 or the associ­
ated Notes and Treatises (Noten und Abhandlungen), exploring Hafis’ 
form-giving and the academic field of Oriental studies. 
On point 2 above: it makes sense for morphomatic cross­cul­
tural analyses to collect more questions than answers, the reason 
being that a German scholar, for instance, asking an ethnologist 
about the existence of functional equivalents for Occidental depic­
tions of death as the Grim Reaper or a personification of sleep in 
African cultures, could very well be answered with a simple no. One 
would have to put the question again more openly, as an inquiry as 
to the figurations through which a non­Occidental culture converts 
the fear of the uncanniness of death into a fear that is founded and 
reasonable. And one might well, with ethnological assistance, find 
answers one was never expecting and find oneself, instead of study­
ing exotic personifications of death, marvelling at ornate African 
burial places, at which families gather in honour of the dead to com­
memorate them. Morphomatic experimental approaches must be 
able to diverge from fixed plans and follow a method of dispersion 
and digression — they are experiments with an uncertain outcome. 
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To take another example: the focus, here, is on figurations of 
creativity. What lasting impact do the old Occidental figurations 
of that ability have which is bestowed upon the creative mind 
by Muses? And what endurance can we assign, in contrast, to 
the autonomous original genius at a time of collective network 
and media creativity? Germans have been clinging for the past 
two centuries to the notion of artistic genius; ever since Goethe’s 
Wilhelm Meister, young poets have been writing Bildungs- or Ent-
wicklungsromane as an expression of a singular, unique, distinc­
tive, unmistakable originality. In Asia, this would be unthinkable, 
as even the biographies of celebrated women or men deal with 
the disappearance of personal history in contemporary history. 
The search for figurations of genius in Asia may fail, but such 
failures have a maieutic function: they serve the art of midwifing 
new thoughts, they let us hope that wrong questions may lead to 
more accurate ones. 
In light of the discrepancy between possibilities and viabili­
ties in the field of morphomatic analysis, the challenge lies in the 
rational limitation of the research focus to issues for which there 
may be pragmatic solutions. Research interests and expertise are 
to be taken into account, but primarily it is the relevance of case 
studies for an understanding of a culture that we must consider. 
My personal focus at Morphomata is on Figurations of the Creative 
and Figurations of Death, both of which raise questions relevant to 
all cultures: how does innovation enter the world; and how does 
a society come to terms with the deepest and most basic uncer­
tainty of human existence, the awareness of mortality? For on this 
depends any assignment of meaning to earthly existence, as does 
any notion of worldly or otherworldly salvation. In cooperation 
with the fellows of the Cologne Center for Advanced Studies in 
the Humanities Morphomata who, in their national and discipli­
nary diversity, make up an ideal selection committee, I am aiming 
to gradually compile a historical and cross­cultural archive of 
these groups of figurations, without any claim to totality or canon 
formation, within the open and experimental structures of the 
Institute and having regard to a “cure of intellects”. 
i v . “darum beHagt  dem d icHtergen ie  das  element  der  
melancHol ie ”   /  “ tHus  melancHoly  i s  a  congen ial 
element  for  poet ic  gen ius”  —  endurance , a  case  study 
in  H istor ical  perspect i ve  ( ar istotle , dürer , goetHe  e tc . )
Morphomatics analyses the passing on of aesthetic ideas in their 
bonding with concrete artefacts. It is concerned with the ana­
lysis of genealogy, creative media and the dynamics of cultural 
figurations to which a sustained cultural impact may be credited. 
The concept of Morphomata is not to be mistaken for a mor­
phological conception which might address original templates of 
a culture as patterns from which historically later forms can be 
deduced. The key concern is not an ostensibly continuous and 
regular change of form, which is to say the metamorphosis of an 
original shape, as in Goethe’s organic and holistic teleological 
morphology, developed on the basis of naturally given forms — in­
stead, it is precisely the transformation of knowledge in identical 
forms, or rather: forms that are recognisable despite medial or 
material differences. This outlines a theory of the contingency 
of culture that is able to address discontinuities and continuities, 
the persistence of cultural artefacts, their fading and their recur­
rence. Put differently: in the context of a history of science, the 
legitimation for the actuality of morphome­analyses could in this 
age of open epistemologies, lie in the realisation that continuities 
and discontinuities as well as contingencies in historical deve­
lopments and uncertainties in the knowledge of being can more 
adequately be addressed in the study of aesthetic ideas than in 
the study of rational ideas. In support of this, I offer a brief mor­
phomatic case study from the field of the figurations of creativity. 
On the basis of Aristotle’s Problemata Physica XXX,1 and 
Dürer’s engraving Melencolia I and by means of a number of 
artefacts of varying mediality, we can provide evidence to sup­
port a connection between melancholy and genius in Occidental 
culture. The examples are prominent and well explored; I am 
none the less concerned with a demonstration of the method 
and – I trust — the fruitfulness of a morphomatic approach. The 
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Problemata Physica, attributed to Aristotle, are a 3rd century BC 
work divided into 38 individual books, touching on questions of 
wine­drinking, fatigue, sexual intercourse, mathematics, harmony 
etc., and bringing together a number of most diverse sources, 
whilst mainly containing thoughts by Aristotle and his succes­
sor in the Peripatetic school, Theophrastus. Despite their tre­
mendous amount of material, their mixture of medical, botanical, 
zoological and musical knowledge, they are – according to the 
editor of the German edition, Hellmut Flashar – considered to be 
“the most sorely neglected writing of the Corpus Aristotelicum to 
date”.13 The problem XXX,1 would, then, be an exception to the 
rule. To speak of an historical ineffectiveness could not be further 
from the truth. And according to the morphomatic hypothesis, 
this has to do with the preeminent form­giving within this short 
passage – a paradoxical account, both formally and in regard to 
its content, and a dissection of the initial problem, evoking a 
“multiplicity of partial representations” in the Kantian sense; ex­
panding what we may think and know beyond the limits of a 
contemporary knowledge of melancholy in such a way that they 
become “fragments for the future”.14
“[W]hy”, the problem asks at the outset, “is it that all those 
who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or poetry or 
the arts are clearly of an atrabilious temperament […], some of 
them to such an extent as to be affected by diseases caused by 
black bile […]?” 15 Over the course of the analysis, the question 
becomes a proposition: Melancholics outshine “the majority of 
people”, “either in education or in the arts or in public life”.16 On 
the one hand, the proposition is founded medically, on the other 
hand in epic verse and descriptions of everyday situations. A ten­
	 13 “[...] die bis heute am stärksten vernachlässigte Schrift des Corpus 
Aristotelicum”. Cf. Aristoteles 1991, 295.
	 14 This is Friedrich Schlegel’s felicitous term (“Fragmente für die Zu­
kunft”) for projects of lasting impact, to be found in the Athenäums-
fragment No. 22. Cf. Schlegel 1958, vol.2, Erste Abteilung. Kritische 
Neuausgabe: Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796–1801), 168 f. 
	 15 Aristotle 1984, 953a10–14. 
	 16 Aristotle 1984, 954b2–3.
sion evolves between the discursive formulation and the narrative 
exposition of the problem of melancholy. The depiction is any­
thing but homogenous and cohesive and features signs of rupture 
that are not obscured, but rather revealed by the narrative evi­
dence. The thought­image becomes ambiguous. In the research on 
the Problemata, the peculiarity of this form­giving has, to date, been 
ignored. There was a tendency to reduce the problem to its first 
striking sentence, only paying attention to the “logical attributes” 
of the argument, not the “aesthetic attributes”. From a morpho­
matic perspective, their inter­ and counteraction come into focus, 
and one may comprehend a salient aspect that is usually greeted 
with the utmost surprise: that the Aristotelian figuration of mel­
ancholy genius had for almost 1500 years been forgotten, only to 
stage a triumphant return in the Renaissance and since then to 
have a firm place in the Occidental collective memory. 
Let us take a look at the genealogy of the Problemata Physica 
XXX,1. Its antecedent is the medical discourse. The term melan-
choly in the Corpus Hippocraticum (5th/4th century BC) at the same 
time denotes a discrete, not necessarily pathogenic humour and 
a disease, a disturbance of spirit and temperament. The latter is 
caused by a quantum of black bile being disproportionate to the 
amount of the other three humours, blood, phlegm and yellow 
bile. According to Hippocratic humoural pathology, the balance 
of all humours ensures health; disharmony, causing disarray, 
means illness. Another antecedent for the Aristotelian problem 
of melancholy is found in philosophical discourse, namely Plato’s 
mania­doctrine in Timaeus, which is indebted to Hippocratic hu­
moural pathology. Plato agrees that man loses the right balance 
in illness, by which he means the symmetry of body and soul. In 
Phaidros, Plato distinguishes between ametria and the ecstasy of 
the poets and augurs, which is marked as a god­given elevation to 
a higher order, bearing the risk of a fall into a pathological frenzy. 
The term melancholy, however, is not in use here.17 
	 17 On the concept of melancholy in the Corpus Hippocraticum cf. Flashar 
1966, 21–49; on Plato’s concept of illness cf. the definitive study by 
Tellenbach 1983. 
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To Aristotle, or Theophrastus, the concrete substance of 
black bile is responsible for the ingenious, frenzied hyberbole, as 
it is for the manic­depressive states of the illness of melancholy. 
He does not define melancholy as a mental illness, but as the 
precondition for greatness of mind, as the habitus of “eminent”, 
exceptional men (περιττοί). Today, melancholy is mainly used in 
the third sense, as a temporary disruption of the mind, a trace 
of gloom at the realisation of the transience of all things earthly 
in autumn, for instance. We do not encounter this definition in 
Aristotle at all. The Aristotelian complex essentially functions 
as a structural designation of intellectual greatness. There are 
three conditions for this: sensitivity of character, the ability to 
 transcend the daily arrangements of “ordinary men”,18 and the 
ability to master excellence without succumbing to illness. The 
first two, according to Aristotle, are naturally and continuously 
characteristic of the melancholic. In Hippocrates, the predomi­
nance of black bile is only a temporary condition, depending on 
climate and season, whereas in Aristotle it is largely a disposi­
tion, effectively constituting a Typus melancholicus. According to 
contemporary belief, the character is a function of bodily heat. 
Black bile, according to Aristotle, is predisposed towards great 
changes in temperature and can assume extreme levels of heat or 
cold. From this lability and ambivalence, he deduces two lines of 
potential changes in character, at the end of each of which patho­
logical conditions are manifest: if the black bile turns too cold, it 
causes gloom, torpidity, reticence, anxiety and finally an inclina­
tion towards suicide; excessive heat, however, causes liveliness, 
loquaciousness and, in its greatest state of excitement, a patho­
logical mania. Put positively, the melancholic is able to experi­
ence and suffer from the entire spectrum of character changes. 
Sure enough, this time and again disrupts states of orderliness in 
everyday life. Unlike “ordinary natures”, the melancholic lacks a 
stable identity. His Protean nature appears at the root of his sen­
sitivity, his spectral spiritedness at the root of his productive in­
	 18 Aristotle 1984, 954b24.
telligence. Exceptionality is a tightrope walk to be mastered every 
day, threatened by the fall into the pits of manic or depressive 
illness. The melancholic is made aware of the threat to human 
existence by his experiencing it first­hand, and he masters it, says 
Aristotle, by attempting to keep the black bile at a medium level 
both in terms of amount and temperature, in order for it to pos­
sess the faculty of adjustment: to produce heat in states of fear, 
cold in states of excitement. 
Aristotle’s definition of melancholy genius is both a physi­
ological and psychological one, it assigns intellectual giftedness 
to the material, corporeal as well as to the melancholic’s broad 
ability to suffer, the ability to master the spectral spiritedness 
caused by the black bile. It, hence, doubly endows the melancholy 
genius with a humane quality. This involvement of the melancholy 
genius within the realm of the human condition is persuasive, 
even after more than 2000 years; it has, however, signally failed 
to make an impact. Up to the Renaissance, the notion of melan­
choly as an illness was predominant. Since the Renaissance, the 
greats of Occidental culture present the Aristotelian problem of 
melancholy as if were a certification of genius; within its text, 
however, remains implicit what Aristotle had clearly precluded: a 
dichotomy of body and soul. This is all too well known to us since 
Descartes’ theorising. From a morphomatic perspective on the 
specific form-giving of the Problemata Physica XXX,1, Aristotle’s 
part in the forgery of the patent of genius cannot be denied. This 
is due to the brilliant examples of heroic melancholy the reader is 
met with at the outset of the problem. Their persuasive character 
is obvious, yet the content does not match the packaging. For the 
later notion of a melancholic’s ability to attain a higher rank in 
the community due to his natural disposition, the cited verses 
from Homer’s Iliad at the beginning are questionable evidence. 
They evoke entirely different “partial representations” that dis­
tract from the thought of a felicitous connection between melan­
choly and genius within the realm of the humane. The sixth book 
of the Iliad illustrates this: 
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“But the day soon came 
when even Bellerophon was hated by all the gods. 
Across the Alean plain he wandered, all alone, 
eating his heart out, a fugitive on the run 
from he beaten tracks of men.” 19
Homer here depicts Bellerophon, Corinthian national hero and 
grandson of Sisyphus. Bellerophon, planning to fly to Olympus 
on the tamed winged horse Pegasus, as he doubts the meaning 
of his existence and wants to ask the gods for advice, is thrown 
back to earth by the enraged Zeus. Melancholy is the  punishment 
for his hubris. The heroic deeds of Bellerophon, which are in 
accord with the will of the gods, are detailed in Homer’s epic 
at great length, while the poem conceals the sacrilegious ascent 
to Olympus and only hints at Bellerophon’s destiny in the ver­
ses chosen by Aristotle. The epic assigns significance only to 
those who act according to the given world order and represent 
the community. The exceptional case of the distressed thinker 
merits no interest. Attic tragedy pursues a different course, for 
its historical background is the Sophistic crisis of the latter half 
of the 5th century BC, in which Protagoras, Gorgias and Critias 
dissolve the mythical notions of totality of the Homeric epoch 
into subjectivism and relativism. The melancholics, who disrupt 
the divine order and are afflicted with insanity, become the tra­
gic focus. Sophocles’ Ajax as well as Euripides’ Bellerophon and 
Heracles attest to this. 
Of all dramatic heroes, Aristotle’s treatise names these three 
as examples of the melancholy of “those who have become emi­
nent”. His formula, grounded on prudence, of the melancholic’s 
keeping his black bile in balance and subsequently becoming a 
genius approved by the community, is of no practical use to these 
heroes. Clearly, the exceptional nature of melancholics can effec­
tively lead to them doubting, not embodying the divine order that 
unifies the community. In the case of Bellerophon, melancholy 
	 19 Homer, Iliad, Book VI, 236–40, English translation by Robert Fagles, 
Penguin/Viking: New York 1990, p. 202.
is not an illness, but “the affect accompanying the thinking that 
forges on to the end” 20 and thus advances to the threshold of 
human knowledge. Before and after Aristotle, such heroic mel­
ancholy is an expression of the rejection of any vision of the 
totality of an objective order of being. Because the existence of 
such an order is still believed in the Homeric poems, melancholy 
is a miserable affair in that world; to the Attic dramatists, it is 
a tragic plight. The melancholy genius of the modern age draws 
its dignity precisely from the knowledge of being alone with the 
awareness of a “transcendental homelessness” 21 – and perhaps, 
in Lukács’ terms, also with an awareness that each form-giving is 
“indefinable and unformulable […] in [its] very essence”, whereas 
in the epic age, “where beauty is the meaning of the world made 
visible”, “metaphysics [has] anticipated everything aesthetic”. For 
him the order of the epic is fully congruent with the order of life 
and, accordingly, the structure of the epic, binding the parts to 
the whole, is “homogeneously organic and stable” through a mu­
tual determination: uniformity, not strangeness, designates the 
essential relation between elements. 
In contrast, Aristotle’s Problemata Physica I are, in their form-
giving, like the structure of a modern novel in Lukács’ view, “het­
erogeneously contingent and discrete”.22 In the narrativisation 
and discursive unfolding of the problem of melancholy, an iridis­
cent structure emerges, evoking multifarious “partial represen­
tations” of differing cultural impact. The medical argument for 
the connection between melancholy and exceptionality is highly 
differentiated, the ennoblement of melancholy is only apparently 
promoted in the Homeric lines, but the discursive import does 
not match the narrativisation; the “humane”, corporeal version of 
melancholy does not match heroic melancholy. What is interesting 
about Bellerophon, Ajax and Heracles is not their  physiological 
	 20 “[D]er Affekt, welcher das Denken begleitet, welches zu Ende denkt 
[…].”, as elegantly phrased by Schweppenhäuser in Horkheimer 1963, 
281. 
	 21 Lukács 1974, 41.
	 22 Lukács 1974, 74, 34, 76.
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constitution, but the epistemological dimension of their aberra­
tion. Within the medical treatise there is a latent literary dis­
course: the definition of the tragic hero as an intentional outsider, 
doubter and frontiersman of the absolute, a trope which is later to 
become the most fascinating of formulae in the arts, philosophy 
and sociology of the modern age. The double addressing or en­
coding of the essay is not helpful in understanding the endurance 
of Aristotle’s astounding conception of melancholy genius within 
the realm of the human condition. The citation of the heroes is as 
rich in allusion as the physiological figure of thought (Denkfigur) 
of a counter­regulation in the oscillation of tempers — standing 
as an emblem of the exceptional — is  complicated. As opposed 
to this, the simple narrative examples of everyday situations, in 
which Aristotle compares the workings of black bile to the effects 
of wine, cancel out all medical distinctions and are not proof 
of exceptionality, but rather of mood swings. After all, what do 
“those who have become eminent” have in common with drink­
ers who become “compassionate or savage or taciturn”, who are 
“induced” to “kiss persons whom, because of their appearance 
or age, nobody would kiss when sober”, aside from the fact that, 
according to Aristotle, melancholics are also “lustful”?23
This kind of knowledge transfer between narration, question­
ing and instruction may not be uncommon within the Peripa­
tetic school, but that is not the point. What I have attempted to 
demonstrate is rather how the medium of the Problemata Physica 
XXX,1 is not entirely innocent with regard to the messages that 
are later attributed to it. From a morphomatic perspective, a re­
lationship can be assumed between the creative medium and the 
dynamics, i. e. the history of the impact of the Aristotelian prob­
lem of melancholy. The tradition of melancholy is divided after 
Aristotle, but this is not solely attributable to subsequent histori­
cal mutations of religions or mentalities. The connection between 
melancholy and genius is upheld only by those who are familiar 
with it like Cicero: “Aristoteles ait omnes ingeniosos melancholicos 
	 23 Aristotle 1984, 953a30–954b4.
esse”.24 From antiquity to the end of the Middle Ages, the phil­
osophical ennobling of melancholy by Aristotle remains in the 
shadow of the medical, negative conception of melancholy as ill­
ness. This alone becomes popular. The successors of Hippocrates 
are much less interested in the theory of melancholy than in its 
diagnosis and treatment. This explains why the doctrine of the 
four humours remains valid for the explanation of the tempera­
ment and illness of melancholy well into the 18th century. As long 
as black bile is identified as the main cause of the mental illness 
“melancholy”, the therapeutic measures are similar to each other. 
Melancholy as the disturbance of the physical and psychological 
order is treated by means of purging, which is supposed to di­
rectly counter the corrupting humour, which, in turn, has no real 
existence. Diet and distraction were also used to help the patient 
towards a regular way of life or to overcome the paralysis of the 
melancholy condition in the state of depression.25 
The popular version of melancholy as illness makes the artistic 
dimension of melancholy disappear, as does the elite’s concept 
of melancholy since the Renaissance dissolve its physicality in 
the sense of the physical basis of the melancholy intellect as de­
scribed by Aristotle. The latter is demonstrated by Dürer’s 1514 
engraving Melencolia I (fig.1), probably the second most import­
ant showpiece in the history of melancholy genius after the Pro-
blemata Physica. Dürer draws the image of a melancholy thinker 
which is, none the less, a thought­image (Denkbild). The centre 
of the image shows an angel with a shadowed face, personify­
ing the aesthetic idea of the melancholic genius in its modern 
form: the scientist. What is significant is that he is holding the 
compass (Zirkel), which in medieval iconography was a privilege 
of God as the original builder of the world. The early modern 
genius, however, sets out to measure the world on its own, as the 
foremost discipline in the Renaissance was mathematics. There­
fore the angel is not only surrounded by the tools of applied 
mathematics such as a plow, saw and straight edge, which are 
	 24 Cicero: Tusculanae disputationes I, 80.
	 25 Cf. the excellent study by Starobinski 1960. 
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to serve the architect of the new, the modern world­structure, 
but also diagrams of descriptive geometry such as a ball and a 
polyhedron. The new building, discernible at the upper margin 
of Dürer’s Melencolia I, however, does not quite seem to be com­
pleted, as there is a ladder leaning on the building’s wall and the 
scholarly builder is sitting around idly with his head resting in 
his hand – doubt and despair seem to have befallen him in the 
course of his work. The melancholy heroes of Homeric epic and 
Attic tragedy whom Aristotle cites, are incapable of accepting the 
divine world order and act accordingly. Their doubts make them 
into individuals, the price to pay for their hubris is melancholy. 
The same goes for Dürer’s black angel, except in this instance 
the doubts of the early modern genius are no longer directed to­
ward the Greek gods but the Christian and medieval world order. 
Theology in the Middle Ages stigmatised this as the deadly sin 
of tristitia saeculi or acedia. Therefore it comes as no surprise that 
Dürer too is haunted by fantasies of punishment. At the top mar­
gin of the left side of Melencolia I, he has drawn a comet whose 
rays shoot in all directions; it is a symbol of the apocalypse, the 
imminent end of the world.26 
Even without such fears, the freedom of the modern indi­
vidual is problematic. The security of a passive acceptance of the 
medieval ordo, in which every individual is assigned a place with­
in the totality, has been replaced by an uncertainty of competing 
human orders. What is decisive is whether the “destiny towards 
a totality” 27 can still be maintained. Their disappointment breeds 
melancholy. In other words: throughout the ages, the “destiny to­
wards a totality” is the foremost quality of the melancholic. They 
are frontiersmen of the absolute, despairing of — to speak with 
Hamlet as one of the most notable melancholics — the times being 
out of joint and being unable to set this right. Dürer’s engraving 
attests to this in its form­giving: his melancholy angel is paralysed 
in the face of the chaos of measuring apparatus and ambiguous 
	 26 All of this can be found in the famous interpretation of the engraving 
by Panofsky/Saxl 1923. 
	 27 Lukács 1974, 67. 
1	 Albrecht Dürer “Melencolia I” (copper engraving, 1514) 
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signs surrounding him. Needing to act but full of thoughts, he 
resembles Hamlet, the artist of words, Faust and other melan­
choly geniuses at the turning point between the Middle Ages and 
modernity.
He takes an observer’s stance, not wanting to make a fool of 
himself like Don Quijote, the last Knight of the Sorrowful Coun­
tenance. He is no longer a hero, but a scholar and — with regard 
to the Aristotelian problem of melancholy — represents the heroic, 
not the humane variation. He shares Bellerophon’s doubts, as his 
melancholy is not physiological but epistemological: the medical 
discourse is of no concern to Dürer’s engraving, the ennobling of 
melancholy cannot be deduced from it. 
Dürer, the humanist and traveler through Italy, presumably 
knew the Problemata Physica XXX,1 from the treatise De vita libri 
tres of 1482–1489 by the Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino, 
which deals with the health of scholars, reviving the Aristotelian 
doctrine. Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim then communicates 
Ficino’s teachings to Germany, the Nurembergian humanist 
Willibald Pirckheimer in turn transmits Agrippa’s Occulta Philo-
sophia to Dürer. Agrippa’s study of 1510 assigns to the Furor me-
lancholicus an inspirational quality, firstly in regard to imaginatio, 
the artistic imagination, secondly in regard to ratio, scientific cre­
ativity, and thirdly regarding mens, understood as religious meta­
physical thinking.28 Without a doubt, the three spiritual forces are 
expounded in Dürer’s engraving. The focus, however, is on the 
first, as the title Melencolia I reveals. 
The modern genius may reach the limits of scientific and 
metaphysical thinking, but not those of artistic creativity. From 
a morphomatic perspective, this becomes particularly clear in 
Dürer’s engraving, in its genealogy, use of the creative medium 
and dynamics. He addresses the knowledge of various epochs, 
	 28 For a far more detailed account cf. Klibansky/Panofsky/Saxl 1990, 
376–394 (for Dürer) and 493–512 (for Agrippa), to whom I am indebt­
ed to for all data regarding the genealogy of Dürer's engraving. This 
study has been frequently compmented and criticised, most recently by 
Büchsel 2010, Wittstock 2011 and Sieber/Wittstock 2009.
disciplines and cultures. He cites the Aristotelian problem of mel­
ancholy from antiquity. He cites Abu Masar’s Arabian astrology, 
according to which all melancholics are under the rule of the idle, 
heavy and cold Saturn; he refers to the wealth and violence of the 
Greek god Cronus with the symbolic pouch and key, or to the god 
of time, Chronos, with the hourglass, thereby including myths 
of antiquity. He quotes the notion of the scholastic theologian 
Henry of Ghent that all mathematics are melancholics because 
they are bad metaphysicians. He quotes Thomas Aquinas’ con­
demnation of melancholy as the deadly sin of acedia. At the very 
outset of modernity, at a time allowing dreams of a triumphal 
advancement of science, Melencolia I already depicts the scepti­
cism towards science which characterizes the close of modernity. 
Past, present and future; virtuality, actuality and potential, new 
virtuality blend in with each other in the concrete artefact. For 
the sake of a presentation of the aesthetic idea of contemporary 
melancholy, Dürer disperses “logical attributes” as well as “aesthet­
ic attributes” from the cultural history of melancholy. In a time of 
conflicting kinds of knowledge of the world, at the turning point 
between the Middle Ages and modernity, he disperses fragments 
of past and present knowledge in a medium that obeys a logic 
unlike that of science, in the dispersing potential of art, whose 
visual logic is a logic of the de­specialisation of a knowledge not 
bound to any discipline. 
The same goes for the logic of literature, as is attested by 
the tradition of Dürer’s aesthetic idea of melancholy genius in 
subsequent artefacts. The evidence for the lasting impact of 
 Melencolia I in painting and literature is given by major exhibi­
tions and voluminous anthologies.29 An exhaustive analysis of the 
	 29 I will mention only the spectacular Meláncolie/Melancholie­exhibition 
at Galeries nationales du Grand Palais in Paris (2005) and Neue Na­
tional galerie Berlin (2006), which is documented in the catalogue Me-
lancholie. Genie und Wahnsinn in der Kunst (2005), edited by Jean Clair 
and collecting masterpieces by Arnold Böcklin, Giorgio de Chirico, 
Lucas Cranach, Eugène Delacroix, Otto Dix, Caspar David Friedrich, 
Johann Heinrich Füssli, Francisco de Goya, Nicholas Hilliard, Edward 
 Hopper, Anselm Kiefer, Franz Xaver Messerschmidt, Ron Mueck, 
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dynamics of this image cannot be carried out, either historically 
or systematically. The following three examples are meant only to 
illustrate the ways in which Dürer’s form­giving is cited in various 
periods and media. The first originates from Goethe’s collection 
Proverbial Verse (Sprichwörtlich), written from 1812 to 1815. Con­
ceived or written: both verbs apply to the text, as Goethe, here, 
seems to take less the position of original genius than that of a 
collector, poeticising existing proverbs into quatrains: 
Zart Gedicht, wie Regenbogen 
wird nur auf dunklen Grund gezogen; 
Darum behagt dem Dichtergenie 
Das Element der Melancholie.30
This proverb is preceded by another: 
Meine Dichtergluth war sehr gering, 
Solang ich dem Guten entgegen ging; 
Dagegen brannte sie lichterloh, 
Wenn ich vor drohendem Übel floh.31
 Edvard Munch, Pablo Picasso, Nicolas Poussin, Auguste Rodin, Jean­
Antoine Watteau among others as well as brilliant essays by Jean Clair, 
Peter­Klaus Schuster, Jean Starobinski, Werner Spies i. a. – There are 
too many monographs on literary melancholy to be named here. In­
stead, I recommend an old anthology for the exploration of lyrical 
transliterations of Dürer: Ludwig Völker (ed.): “Komm, heilige Melan­
cholie”. Eine Anthologie deutscher Melancholie­Gedichte. Mit Aus­
blicken auf die europäische Melancholie­Tradition in Literatur­ und 
Kunstgeschichte. Stuttgart 1983. The volume has 592 pages. 
	 30 In: Goethe 1987, vol. 2, 237. — “A delicate poem, like a rainbow, / Is 
in scribed only on a dark field; / Thus poetic genius is content / In 
me lan choly’s element.” Translated by Anthony Stephens.
	 31 In: Goethe 1987, vol. 2, 237. — “My poetic fire was nearly spent / As long 
as towards the Good I went; / However it blazed fierce and red, / When 
I from threatening Evil fled.” Translated by Anthony Stephens.
What here is expressed in aphorisms seems to encapsulate the 
most personal of experiences, providing information about the 
potential constitution of Goethe and other literary geniuses. It 
is not a personal entity becoming extrinsical, a verse by Goethe 
becoming a general proverb, but an extrinsicality becoming per­
sonal – proverbs, whose origin no commentary reveals, become 
personal. The Dürer quote is a self­interpretation, the reference 
to Dürer and the genre label lend the proverb universality. And 
Goethe’s proverb proves to be a quite selective actualisation and 
discursive paraphrase of Dürer’s engraving. And Melencolia I is 
ambivalent: on the one hand a critique of modern subjectivity, fe­
ars of divine punishment and commemoration of God’s commit­
ment never again to unleash the Deluge, which is represented by 
the reconciliation of the heavens and earth in the rainbow (“Re­
genbogen”). On the other hand, it is the self­portrayal of modern 
genius, which takes the center with its mathematic and scientific 
apparatuses while the signs of an imminent divine punishment 
for acedia are pushed to the sides. Goethe collects just these signs 
from the sides, the dark ground (“dunkle[ ] Grund”) and its op­
posite, the rainbow. Goethe’s commentary on Diderot’s Notes on 
Painting (“Pensées détachées sur la peinture”) notes on the subject of 
rainbows: “There is not a single harmony because the rainbow, 
because the prism show them to us; instead, said phenomena 
are harmonic because there is a higher universal harmony with 
which they, too, comply.” 32 If a “delicate poem, like a rainbow” 
(“Zart Gedicht wie Regenbogen”) is mentioned, it is the “like”, 
the equation of poetry and rainbow that is of interest. The rain­
bow does not appear in the clear skies, but against the dark field 
of storm­clouds; for Goethe the poem emerges out of melancholy 
as a “delicate” presentation of the absolute, transient like the rain­
bow. To him composition is not an expression of hope lessness, 
	 32 Translated by Anthony Stephens. — “Es gibt nicht eine Harmonie, weil 
der Regenbogen, weil das Prisma sie uns zeigen, sondern diese gen­
annten Phänomene sind harmonisch, weil es eine höhere allgemeine 
Harmonie gibt, unter deren Gesetzen auch sie stehen.” (In: Goethe 
1987, vol. 52, 306).
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but a therapy for melancholy insofar as it is meant to cancel out 
the “transcendental homelessness” and the self­enclosure of mo­
dern subjectivity, insofar as it, like the rainbow, colorfully shows 
a “higher, universal harmony” that every individual is meant 
to comply with. Goethe finds the source of artistic creativity in 
the modern distress with subjectivity, with melancholy as muse, 
poetry as remedy, the figure of movement (Bewegungsfigur) being 
one of the aesthetic conciliation of the individual with generality. 
The poem, like the rainbow, is an expression of a cosmic har­
mony. Goethe’s understanding of poetics, naïve in a Schillerian 
sense, is not a relape into premodern history, nor a restoration 
of antique naïveté. Neither is it an image of heroic doubt or idle 
despair like Dürer’s Melencolia I. Goethe transforms Dürer’s ar­
tistic image into a natural one, allegory into symbol, dispersion 
into metric arrangement. The poem, to him, is the attempt at an 
alternative draft, a place of reconciliation of the general and the 
particular, inner and outer nature, individual and social reality. It 
is thus understandable for him to love proverbs and aphorisms, 
to blend together the individual and the extrinsic into Spruch-
gedichte, to pay no attention to the self­referentiality and claims 
to ownership by the original genius and, in the transliteration of 
Dürer, to discover the serenity of the relatednesss of all artistic 
traditions. As evidence for this, I offer two more poems without 
further commentary. The first is again from the Proverbial Verse 
(Sprichwörtlich): 
Willst du dir aber das Beste thun,  
So bleib’ nicht auf dir selber ruhn, 
Sondern folg’ eines Meisters Sinn;  
Mit ihm zu irren ist dir Gewinn.33
	 33 “If you wish to bring yourself most gain, / Stay not content with your 
own scope, / But follow where a Master leads; / To err with him is sure 
reward.” Translated by Anthony Stephens.
The complementary saying is found in the collection Epigramma-
tic Verse (Epigrammatisch) under the heading Den Originalen and 
mocks the original geniuses: 
Ein Quidam sagt: “Ich bin von keiner Schule; 
Kein Meister lebt, mit dem ich buhle;  
Auch bin ich weit davon entfernt,  
Daß ich von Todten was gelernt.” 
Das heißt, wenn ich ihn recht verstand; 
Ich bin ein Narr auf eigne Hand.34
Finally, a photograph and a sculpture attest to the dynamics of 
Dürer’s engraving. The photograph shows the portrait of Walter 
Benjamin by Gisèle Freund, taken in his Parisian exile in 1938, 
two years before his death, in the pose of Dürer’s melancholic 
angel (fig. 2). — as early as 1913, Benjamin had found the copper 
engraving to be an “unspeakably deep and expressive folio” 35 in 
his visit to an exhibition of Dürer’s graphic works in Basel. Jean 
Selz describes the physiognomy of his friend as that of a melan­
cholic: “face leaned forward, chin held in his right hand. I don’t 
think I have ever seen him think without holding his chin”.36 
Dürer’s melancholy­image stands at the inception of modernity, 
Benjamin’s awareness of the melancholic, a belated phenomenon, 
at its end. His main figure of identification is Charles Baudelaire, 
whose gift he termed “heroic melancholy”.37 Baudelaire, of course, 
	 34 “A Someone says: ‘I adhere to no school; / No Master lives with whom 
I vie; / Likewise I am far removed / From having learned aught from 
the dead.’ That means, have I conned it aright: / ‘I am a fool in my 
own right.’ ” In: Goethe 1987, vol. 2, 224, 276. Translated by Anthony 
Stephens.
	 35 “[Ein] unsagbar tiefes ausdrucksvolles Blatt”. This quote of Benjamin 
from a letter to Franz Sachs on July 11th 1913 is found in: Benjamin 
1978, vol. 1, 76. Translated by Anthony Stephens.
	 36 “[D]as Gesicht vornüber geneigt, das Kinn in die rechte Hand gestützt. 
Anders als in dieser Stellung habe ich ihn, glaube ich, nie nachdenken 
sehen” (Selz 1968, 38). Translated by Anthony Stephens.
	 37 “Melanchthon's term Melencolia illa heroica (this heroic melancholy) 
characterises Baudelaire's gift most perfectly.” (Benjamin 1985, 54) / 
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no longer has anything in common with the increased self­awa­
reness of melancholy genius at the beginning of modernity that 
had gone on to take possession of the world and eventually ended 
up having even the notion of property taken away. According to 
Benjamin, the melancholy of the flâneur Baudelaire in the crowd 
is heroic, because it preserves the Gestus of the struggle against 
the demise of the modern subject: 
“The hero is the true subject of modernity. In other 
words, it takes a heroic constitution to live modernity. 
[…] Modernity must stand under the sign of suicide, an 
act which seals a heroic will that makes no concessions 
to a mentality inimical toward this will. Such a suicide is 
not resignation but heroic passion.” 38 
Heroic melancholy and modern subjectivity appear to be insepa­
rably linked, until death do them part. Heroic melancholy arose 
from reason’s ambition to explain that which is counter­rational, 
transcending reason, out of a “destiny towards a totality” which 
was thoroughly disavowed in the 20th century. A final great ex­
ponent of heroic melancholy, again a literary figure, is  Adrian 
Lever kühn, the composer in Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus 
novel. Dürer’s melancholy­engraving hangs above his piano, he 
suffers from headaches and sloth, particularly his own artistic 
sterility; he wants to create something new and objective like 
the poets of mythical times; hence the pact with the devil, who 
is supposed to provide inspiration for absolute music, but ends 
up only betraying him. Mann compares Leverkühn’s “destiny 
“Der Terminus von Melanchthon Melencolia illa heroica bezeichnet 
Baudelaires ingenium am vollkommensten.” (In: Benjamin 1980, vol. 
I,2, 689). 
	 38 Cf. Benjamin 2003, 44 f.. — “Der Heros ist das wahre Subjekt der mo­
dernité. Das will besagen — um die Moderne zu leben, bedarf es einer 
he roischen Verfassung. […] Die Moderne muß im Zeichen des Selbst­
mords stehen, der das Siegel unter ein heroisches Wollen setzt, das der 
ihm feindlichen Gesinnung nichts zugesteht. Dieser Selbstmord ist nicht 
Verzicht, sondern heroische Passion.” (Benjamin 1980, vol. I,2, 577 f.).
2	 Walter Benjamin (photograph by Gisèle Freund, 1938)
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towards a totality” with the totalitarian disposition of the Ger­
mans, who made a pact with the devil Hitler. 
The greatest advance in the knowledge of postmodern society 
lies in the realisation that the necessary frustration of the desire 
for the absolute is no reason to become melancholy. Heroic mel­
ancholy, therefore, has become rare. In postheroic times, a differ­
ent form of melancholy threatens us: the return of the deadly sin 
acedia as a — now — dull despair, as idleness of head and heart, as 
indifference and arrogance, as exhaustion and dreamless torpor. I 
find it in Ron Mueck’s untitled polyester sculpture (fig. 3), made 
in 2000.
3	 Ron Mueck “Untitled (Big Man)” (pigmented polyester resin on 
fiberglass, 203.8 × 120.7 × 204.5 cm, 2000)
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v . on  tHe  gradual  format ion  of  tHougHts  WH i l e 
speak ing  ( k l e i s t )  —endurance  and  med ium , a  c ase 
s tudy  in  s ys t emat i c  p erspec t i v e
Paradoxically, endurance is not a question of linear successive 
chronology, even though the historical sequence in the last sec­
tion may have suggested that. From a morphomatic perspective, 
endurance is a question of a pragmatic production of evidence 
that is, firstly, discursive and secondly, a production of evidence 
by means of a ritualisation or deliberate repetition. A production of 
evidence in artefacts in which an aesthetic idea that once gained 
prominence is passed on, regardless of whether we are moving 
backwards or forwards in time. Put differently, the evidence and 
dynamics of the Aristotelian Problemata Physica XXX,1 is attribu­
table to the evidence and dynamics of Dürer’s Melencolia I. They 
mutually provide endurance. The endurance of the historically 
earlier artefact depends on whether and how the later artefact 
invokes it. There is certainly no question of chronology in de­
termining which of the two artefacts has a stronger impact. The 
large number of potential artefacts passing on aesthetic ideas will 
not be connected in a chain of cause and effect. Their entire­
ty could at best be described in terms of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
concept of “family resemblance” (Familienähnlichkeit),39 in that an 
artefact A does not necessarily share a partial representation with 
artefact B, each, however, share a — different — partial representa­
tion with artefact C and therefore all belong to a family of arte­
facts passing on the “multiplicity of partial representations” of an 
aesthetic idea, as described by Kant. 
It could be objected that the concept of family resemblance 
suggests a quasi natural, genetic coherence of the artefacts and 
therefore conceals the fact that this coherence is, of course, fabri­
cated and at best due to the taxonomic desire of historic science. 
Wittgenstein himself uses the term metaphorically for everyday 
	 39 Cf. Wittgenstein 2003, 324 ff.
language­games. It might be more adequate to distinguish be­
tween necessary and redundant partial representations in respect 
of the recognisability of an aesthetic idea, although this distinc­
tion is very difficult. It is clear that a morphomatic approach 
does not have to set out to mark historically initial­ or source­
morphomata. It requires no primordial fantasies. What is decisive 
is rather the question of how the passing on of aesthetic ideas 
works in varying material and medial form­giving. In solving this 
problem one should avoid — firstly — aporetic speculations about 
an aesthetics of the in-between, about a transitory logic from one 
artefact to another and — secondly — one should focus on the par­
ticularity of any medium, of any medial or material form-giving. 
To cite an example: let us assume that an actor reads a script 
in which, in grave sentences, he is assigned the role of a melan­
choly genius, and imagines a production of it. According to Pier 
Paolo Pasolini, the structure of the script is a “structure wanting 
to be another structure”.40 The fixed sentences must be able to 
be embodied in oral language, in facial expressions, gestures and 
movement. But can there be a smooth transition between the 
literal sentences of the script and the images of the film? Is there 
a logic of in-between?41 Naïve screenwriters attempt to fix this tran­
sitory logic by adding enacting suggestions to the dialogues in 
the script in a subtext. Nothing angers actors, directors, costume 
designers, scenographers and other creatives involved in the col­
lective process of the production of a film more than this. What is 
disregarded by these additions is the uniqueness of the cinematic 
image vis­à­vis the text, as well as the circumstance that there 
can be at most an analogous, never a causal relation between the 
script’s sentences and the film’s images. The sentence “I am so 
melancholy today” may be represented by black clothes, a walk 
in a foggy winter scene, a head bent forward or the constriction 
of a bleak apartment. Between text and cinematic image there 
can be no linear translation, no continuous transition or logical 
	 40 Cf. Pasolini 1975, 205­212. — “[…] eine Struktur, die eine andere Struktur 
sein will”.
	 41 “Poetik des Dazwischen”. Cf. Sombroek 2004. 
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transfer from one medium to the other; in actuality it is a leap 
from one medium to the other, occasioned by the postulate of a 
purely functional analogy in mood. Once again: one has to focus 
on the particularity of any medium, of any medial or material 
giving form or giving shape as a catalyst of creativity, which is re­
sponsible for the reinvocation of the Old always developing into 
the New. That will be demonstrated now by an historical case 
study in a systematic perspective — on the basis of Heinrich von 
Kleist’s essay On the Gradual Formation of Thoughts While Speaking 
(Über die allmählige Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden), which 
itself belongs to the most prominent texts in the field of cultural 
figurations of creativity. 
In his Critique of Judgment of 1790, Kant noted that the origin 
of creativity is unknown to a creative individual, who accordingly 
“cannot describe or indicate scientifically how it brings about its 
products […]. Hence the author of a product for which he is in­
debted to his genius does not himself know how he has come by 
his ideas; and he has not the power to devise the like at pleasure 
or in accordance with a plan, and to communicate it to others in 
precepts that will enable them to produce similar products.” 42 The 
origin of creativity marks a crucial point of difficulty for poets, 
artists and scholars alike.43 Hence Kant suggests we take the ques­
tion of creativity not as being about the origin of production, but 
rather as about the produced work, about whose exceptional qual­
ity the community of readers has already formed an opinion.44 
In his essay On the Gradual Formation of Thoughts While Speaking 
	 42 “Daß es, wie es sein Product zu Stande bringe, selbst nicht beschreiben, 
oder [sic!] wissenschaftlich anzeigen könne, sondern daß es als Na-
tur die Regel gebe; und daher der Urheber eines Produkts, welches er 
seinem Genie verdankt, selbst nicht weiß, wie sich in ihm die Ideen 
dazu herbei finden, auch es nicht in seiner Gewalt hat, dergleichen 
nach Belieben oder planmäßig auszudenken und anderen in sol­
chen Vorschriften mitzutheilen, die sie in Stand setzen, gleichmäßige 
Produkte hervorzubringen.” (Kant 1983, 406 f. / Kant 1914).
	 43 Cf. Blamberger 1991.
	 44 Cf. Kant 1983, 405 / Kant 1914: “Genius is the talent (or natural gift) 
which gives the rules to Art.” (“Genie ist das Talent (Naturgabe), wel­
of 1805/06, Kleist opens a different perspective. He is concerned 
with the psychological and mediate conditions of the production 
process. 
The essay starts out harmlessly, with the proposition of the 
“rule” of prudence that, like appetite, which comes with eating, 
thoughts come to be in the process of speaking. A series of quite 
heterogeneous case studies is adduced to illustrate this claim. 
They have in common that, following an uncertain beginning or 
silence, the gradual formation of thoughts while speaking stag­
es a test of creativity featuring an agonal structure in the com­
munication of subject and observer. Evidently, Kleist considers 
aggression to be a source of creativity, whether it be scholarly, 
artistic, or political. In each case, the aggression is directed to­
wards an opponent embodying real or symbolic social institutions 
that restrain the self­development of the individual. In the first 
case, Kleist, becoming “excite[d]” while solving a mathematical 
problem, outtalks his tranquilly quiet sister “like a general”, as if 
performing an urgent act of self­assertion against a representative 
of familial determination. The second case sees Molière prevail 
over his maidservant who — as an imaginary opponent — antici­
pates the literary audience’s judgement of his embryonic work. 
The third case deals with political attempts at liberation with the 
genesis of the French Revolution in Mirabeau’s speech of June 
1789, in which he defies Louis XVI’s orders to disband the Third 
Estate. The fourth case recounts La Fontaine’s fable Les animaux 
malades de la peste. The lion, the king of the animals, looking for 
someone to blame for the outbreak of the plague, sentences the 
fox, who is guilty of the worst sins, to death. The lion represents 
the constraining power of the naturally strongest, but the fox 
succeeds in saving his neck by an artful speech. Kleist’s final ex­
ample is a university oral examination. The test of creativity fails 
here, because the examiner does not allow the rivalry with the 
ches der Kunst die Regel gibt”) and 409: “[T]he rule must be derived 
from the fact, i. e. from the product” (“[D]ie Regel muß von der Tat, 
d. i. vom Produkt abstrahiert werden”). 
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examinee, expecting only his own echo and not the candidate’s 
“individual resonance”.45
Nothing new can come of mere imitation. In regard to a his­
tory of literature and of mentalities, Kleist’s images of creativity 
demonstrate his association with the artistic debate of the 17th 
and 18th century: the 1687 Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes at 
the Académie Française, the famous quarrel about the merits of 
contemporary culture compared to that of the ancients, as well 
as its continuation in the discourse on genius in the European 
Enlightenment. Here, the idea of a competition between the gen­
erations becomes prominent, as the necessary rebellion of the 
new against the old, as the notion of non­conformity as a prereq­
uisite for originality. Edward Young’s 1759 compendium Conjec-
tures on Original Composition, translated into German only a year 
after its publication, became a model for the German authors of 
Sturm- und Drang (Storm and Stress). Nature, says Young:
“brings us into the world all Originals: No two faces, no 
two minds, are just alike; but all bear Nature’s evident 
mark of Separation on them. [§164] Born Originals, how 
comes it to pass that we die Copies? That meddling Ape 
Imitation […] snatches the Pen, and blots out nature’s 
mark of Separation, cancels her kind intention, destroys 
all mental Individuality […].” 46
Kleist does not appear to show a great deal of originality him­
self in marking creativity as a critical test of the assertion of the 
creative’s peculiarity and uniqueness. He is, however, more ra­
dical than Young, more radical, most notably, than the aesthetic 
philosophies of Classicism. In Idealism — in Schiller’s concept of 
aesthetic education, for example —, the prerequisite for an auto­
nomy of the mind is the division of its sphere, separating the art 
	 45 “[E]s ist so schwer, auf ein menschliches Gemüt zu spielen und ihm 
seinen eigentümlichen Laut abzulocken […].” The essay, with all of its 
quotes, is found in Kleist 1991, vol. 3, 534–540 / Kleist 1997, 405–9.
	 46 Young 1759, 42.
of discovery and self­discovery confronting societal conventiona­
lity from the “practical life”. In Kleist’s Letter of a Young Poet to 
a Young Painter (Brief eines jungen Dichters an einen jungen Maler), 
the poet speaks of the possibility of “secretly locking the doors 
at night­time” “in defiance of [the] inhumane tutors”, in order to 
“try oneself in the art of invention, this game of the blessed”.47 
In his essay On the Gradual Formation of Thoughts While Speaking, 
however, Kleist does not allow for this playful exit strategy. The 
societal institutions effectively are the field in which one is to 
prove one’s ability to help oneself to the creative spirit enabling 
empowerment by commanding or destroying the powers that be. 
A second criterion that distinguishes Kleist’s essay from Idea­
lism, one very revealing of Kleist’s historical position, is the fact 
that the constitution of the genius is no longer tied to any moral 
legitimation. Even the poets of the Genius Era of Storm and Stress 
had rebelled against authority in the name of heart, reason, and 
morality. In Kleist’s essay, there is no mention of the substance 
of the formulated thoughts, and creativity does not appear to 
play a part in the education of mankind, as it does in Idealism. 
The fox in Kleist’s version of La Fontaine’s fable does not want 
to stop the lion’s plan for a sacrifice. His rhetoric does not aim 
to achieve the lion’s aesthetic education. He simply saves himself 
with an aggressive flash of inspiration in pointing out another 
candidate for death among his listeners: the innocent donkey.
It may be due to Kleist’s military background that he discov­
ers aggression as the motor of creativity, no longer making the 
Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes a purely aesthetic and cogni­
tive affair, but deliberately revealing the psychological driving 
forces behind artistic creativity, thereby uncovering the correla­
tion between destruction and construction. So much for the ge-
nealogy of Kleist’s form­giving of creativity in the examples of his 
essay, which reveal nothing about the creative’s gift, the phases 
	 47 “Die Einbildungskraft würde sich […] in unseren Brüsten geregt haben, 
und wir, unseren unmenschlichen Lehrern zum Trotz, […] heimlich 
zur Nachtzeit die Türen verschlossen haben, um uns in der Erfindung, 
diesem Spiel der Seligen, zu versuchen. ” (Kleist 1991, vol. 3, 552 f.).
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of creative thinking or the mathematical, political, or literary idea 
as its final product. What is fascinating about Kleist’s essay on 
creativity is that it addresses the mediate quality of the form-giving 
regardless of the substance of its subject. Thoughts are gradually 
produced whilst speaking, that is in and through their medium. 
Kleist thus reverses the basic assumption of traditional rhetoric, 
according to which thinking necessarily precedes speaking, with 
the speaker expanding on a previously formed thought in a con­
trolled and effective speech. According to Kleist, on the contrary, 
the thoughts gradually formed while speaking owe themselves to 
the “obstinacy of the medium language”, for which they are not 
“transcendent of language”, but “exclusively pertaining to language”.48
The creative process, consequently, is neither a mere transla­
tion from an internal language of the brain, a language of internal 
thoughts, nor a translation form the external world in the sense of 
reproduction or mimesis. Any speaker or writer knows how dif­
ficult first sentences, first manuscript pages can be until a mode 
of expression is found that makes a clear argument. Creativity 
for Kleist does not appear as the reproduction of a previous ex­
perience, or of one imagined, but rather as a mode of experience 
within the medium itself, in which a perceptio confusa transforms 
itself into a perceptio distincta by way of speech, potentially dis­
turbing and disrupting objections to it: 
“But because I do have some dim conception at the 
outset, one distantly related to what I am looking for, 
if I boldly make a start with that, my mind, even as my 
speech proceeds, under the necessity of finding an end 
for that beginning, will shape my first confused idea into 
complete clarity so that, to my amazement, understand­
ing is arrived at as the sentence ends. I put in a few un­
articulated sounds, dwell lengthily on the conjunctions, 
perhaps make use of apposition where it is not necessary, 
and have recourse to other tricks which will spin out my 
	 48 “Eigensinn des Mediums Sprache”; “sprachtranszendent[ ]”; “ausschließlich 
sprachgenuine Inhalte” (Cf. Jäger 2005, 45–64) 
speech, all to gain time for the fabrication of my idea in 
the workshop of the mind. And in this process nothing 
helps me more than if my sister makes a move indicating 
she wishes to interrupt; for such an attempt from outside 
to wrest speech from its grasp still further excites my 
already labouring mind and, like a great general when 
circumstances press, its powers are raised by a further 
degree.” 49 
The “prudential rule” is: Submit to the figures of regulation of 
the medium, try to act calmly without knowing the direction of 
your actions. The situation, then, is paradoxical, the speech­act 
recursive: by means of still unstructured speech the speaker gains 
time to distinguish thoughts that are only to be found in hearing 
himself speak, which he does by making use of the formative 
powers of the medium.50 The medium, in this case speech, proves 
	 49 “Aber weil ich doch irgend eine dunkle Vorstellung habe, die mit dem, 
was ich suche, von fern her in einiger Verbindung steht, so prägt, 
wenn ich nur dreist den Anfang mache, das Gemüt, während die Rede 
fortschreitet, in der Notwendigkeit, dem Anfang nun auch ein Ende 
zu finden, jene verworrene Vorstellung zur völligen Deutlichkeit aus, 
dergestalt, daß die Erkenntnis, zu meinem Erstaunen mit der Periode 
fertig ist. Ich mische unartikulierte Töne ein, ziehe die Verbindungs­
wörter in die Länge, gebrauche auch wohl eine Apposition, wo sie nicht 
nötig wäre, und bediene mich anderer, die Rede ausdehnender Kun­
stgriffe, zur Fabrikation meiner Idee auf der Werkstätte der Vernunft, 
die gehörige Zeit zu gewinnen. Dabei ist mir nichts heilsamer, als eine 
Bewegung meiner Schwester, als ob sie mich unterbrechen wollte; denn 
mein ohnehin schon angestrengtes Gemüt wird durch diesen Versuch 
von außen, ihm die Rede, in deren Besitz es sich befindet, zu entreißen, 
nur noch mehr erregt, und in seiner Fähigkeit, wie ein großer General, 
wenn die Umstände drängen, noch um einen Grad höher gespannt” 
(Kleist 1991, vol. 3, 535 f. / Kleist 1997, 405 f.)
	 50 As a further indicator of Kleist's historical position, we may compare 
his view of the dominance of language as medium over what is ex­
pressed in it with the following lines from Percy Bysshe Shellley's 
Prometheus Unbound (1820): “Language is a perpetual Orphic song, / 
Which rules with Dædal harmony a throng / Of thoughts and forms, 
which else senseless and shapeless were.” (Act 4, Scene 1) Shelley 1874, 
256. We should also note that Kleist stands apart from the mainstream 
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to be beneficial to creativity in the obstructiveness and obstin­
acy of its semantic, syntactical, and pragmatic uses and restricti­
ons. What also presents an obstacle is the listener as antagonist, 
who dis ciplines or stimulates the speaker’s discourse — because 
speech, like any medium, relies on a structurally interactive sche­
me of consensus, a hybrid of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. 
According to Kleist the trigger of ideas is the medium of 
their expression. There is no consciousness outside of language, 
it structures and generates itself within language. The medium 
is always prior to consciousness. Consequently, it is obvious how 
productive and innovative Kleist’s shift in the question of crea­
tivity from the origin of formation to the process of formation is 
still today. Contrary to the notion of creativity as an ingenious 
subject’s independent cognitive capacity prior to all expression, 
deliberately occupying any one medium for the purpose of its 
actualisation, as was widespread in the Genius Era of Sturm und 
Drang and, to some extent, is still today, creativity is a knowledge 
of experience that is only generated in action. In contrast to the 
aesthetic of genius, Kleist provocatively notes: “For it is not we 
who know. It is a certain state of ourselves that knows.” 51 Therefore 
creativity, and Kleist’s case studies attest to this, is by no means a 
calculable process, in the sense of a transformation of knowledge 
and intentions into action, but a mode of experience: in speak­
ing and speaking on, as well as in writing and writing on, in the 
working processes of a painter or sculptor as well in those of a 
composer. This defines art as experience52 of a shared agency53 be­
tween artist and medium or material, artist and imaginary or real 
observer. The creative person is part of an experimental complex. 
of European Romanticsm through his emphasis on the agonal aspect 
of the creative process, whereas Shelley sees it as a “harmonious rule”. 
I am indebted to Anthony Stephens for this parallel.
	 51 “Denn nicht wir wissen, es ist allererst ein gewisser Zustand unsrer, 
welcher weiß.” (Kleist 1991, 540 / Kleist 1997, 409).
	 52 Dewey 1934.
	 53 The conception of creativity as shared agency between humans, media 
and apparatuses was perhaps first documented by Kleist — cf. Latour 
1996, or Gell 1968, among others. 
There is no externality to creative experiments and, according to 
Kleist, those experiments are most rewarding in terms of innova­
tion, in which the unforeseen occurs and disturbances interrupt 
the creative process. Creativity always requires a readiness to as­
sume risks, particularly in an understanding of the constructive 
qualities of disturbances and a readiness to — as it were — be over-
written by the medium or the observer. Kleist agrees that necessity 
is the mother of invention or, with Niklas Luhmann: creativity 
is about “the use of contingencies for the purpose of building 
structures”.54 Also with respect to the contingencies of form­giving, 
I find Kleist’s text to be an important account for the engage­
ment with the mediate quality of the morphomatic — a meta­
morphome in a sense, with a formidable dynamics that cannot 
be analysed here.55 
	 54 “Verwendung von Zufällen zum Aufbau von Strukturen” (Luhmann 
1988, 17).
	 55 On the dynamics and mediate quality of Kleist’s essay cf. the constitu­
tive essay by Pass 2003, 107–136, to whom I owe much of this chapter, 
much as I do to Ludwig Jäger’s theory of transcription. On the bio­
graphical and literary context of Kleist's essay see furthermore Blam­
berger 2011a, 161–201.
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v i . “ tHe  age  o f  compar i son” (n i e t zscHe )
“The Age of Comparison. — The less men are fettered by 
tradition, the greater becomes the inward activity of their 
motives; the greater, again, in proportion thereto, the 
outward restlessness, the confused flux of mankind, the 
polyphony of strivings. For whom is there still an abso­
lute; a compulsion to bind himself and his descendants 
to one place? For whom is there still anything strictly 
compulsory? As all styles of arts are imitated simultane­
ously, so also are all grades and kinds of morality, of cus­
toms, of cultures. — Such an age derives its importance 
from the fact that in it the various views of the world, 
customs, and cultures can be compared and experienced 
simultaneously, which was formerly not possible with 
the always localised dominance of every culture, corre­
sponding to all artistic styles being grounded in place 
and time. An increased aesthetic feeling will now at last 
decide amongst so many forms presenting themselves for 
comparison; it will allow the greater number, that is to 
say all those rejected by it, to die out. In the same way a 
selection amongst the forms and customs of the higher 
moralities is taking place, of which the aim can be noth­
ing else than the downfall of the lower moralities. It is 
the age of comparison! That is its pride — but more justly 
also its grief. Let us not be afraid of this grief! Rather will 
we comprehend as adequately as possible the task our age 
sets us: posterity will bless us for doing so, a posterity 
which knows itself to be as much above the defunct origi­
nal national cultures as above the culture of comparison, 
but which looks back with gratitude on both kinds of 
culture as upon antiquities worthy of veneration.” 56
	 56 “Zeitalter der Vergleichung. – Je weniger Menschen durch das Herkommen 
gebunden sind, um so grösser wird die innere Bewegung der Motive, 
um so grösser wiederum, dem entsprechend, die äussere Unruhe, das 
Nietzsche’s aphorism No. 23 in the first volume of Human, All-
Too-Human (Menschliches, Allzumenschliches) hopes for “an increa­
sed aesthetic feeling” due to the “many forms presenting them­
selves for comparison”; he designs a process of learning in three 
consecutive stages. The “higher” “kinds of morality, of customs, 
of cultures” are not attainable unless one has “experienced” the 
pluralism of cultures; the pluralism not attainable unless one has 
abandoned a purely national culture. The “age of comparison” re­
quires a “culture of comparison”, a method for the comparison of 
cultures, which – this is indicated by Nietzsche’s mention of the 
involvement of “grief ” — must not be uncritical, but should lead 
to decisions in the sense of qualitative judgements, separating 
the necessary from the superfluous. Such a decision, how ever, 
Durcheinanderfluten der Menschen, die Polyphonie der Bestrebungen. 
Für wen giebt es jetzt noch einen strengeren Zwang, an einen Ort sich 
und seine Nachkommen anzubinden? Für wen giebt es überhaupt noch 
etwas streng Bindendes? Wie alle Stilarten der Künste nebeneinander 
nachgebildet werden, so auch alle Stufen und Arten der Moralität, der 
Sitten, der Culturen. – Ein solches Zeitalter bekommt seine Bedeutung 
dadurch, dass in ihm die verschiedenen Weltbetrachtungen, Sitten, 
Culturen verglichen und neben einander durchlebt werden können; 
was früher, bei der immer localisirten Herrschaft jeder Cultur, nicht 
möglich war, entsprechend der Gebundenheit aller künstlerischen Stil­
arten an Ort und Zeit. Jetzt wird eine Vermehrung des ästhetischen 
Gefühls endgültig unter so vielen der Vergleichung sich darbietenden 
Formen entscheiden: sie wird die meisten, – nämlich alle, welche du­
rch dasselbe abgewiesen werden, – absterben lassen. Ebenso findet 
jetzt ein Auswählen in den Formen und Gewohnheiten der höheren 
Sittlichkeit statt, deren Ziel kein anderes, als der Untergang der nied­
rigeren Sitt lichkeiten sein kann. Es ist das Zeitalter der Vergleichung! 
Das ist sein Stolz, – aber billigerweise auch sein Leiden. Fürchten wir 
uns vor diesem Leiden nicht! Vielmehr wollen wir die Aufgabe, welche 
das Zeitalter uns stellt, so gross verstehen, als wir nur vermögen: so 
wird uns die Nachwelt darob segnen, – eine Nachwelt, die ebenso sich 
über die abgeschlossenen originalen Volks­Culturen hinaus weißt, als 
über die Cultur der Vergleichung, aber auf beide Arten der Cultur als 
auf verehrungswürdige Alterthümer mit Dankbarkeit zurückblickt.” 
(Nietzsche 1980, vol. 2, 44 f.) Also cf. the lucid study by Elberfeld 2008, 
115–142.
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is only justified as an individual one, not as universal. One has 
to personally “experience[…]” it. Only with this reservation can 
morphomatics be considered a helpful method of comparison of 
national, historical or disciplinary cultures and can the discourse 
in an International Centre for Advanced Study called  Morphomata 
be productive. 
If one is to follow Nietzsche’s stages of education, the start­
ing­point is to be the national culture, the present day or the 
single discipline in order to be able to formulate cross­cultural 
questions, which, then, should be committed to Goethe’s dictum: 
“By the way, I hate everything that merely instructs me, with­
out increasing or immediately stimulating my activity.” 57 In the 
wake of this case study on the evidence for melancholy genius in 
Occidental culture, the following question will not be irrelevant 
to a morphomatician, who will often be found sitting with his 
head bent over books: Are all thinkers melancholy? The search 
for artefacts of foreign cultures, in which the refutation of this 
assumption takes shape, could indeed be a rewarding pleasure.
	 57 “Übrigens ist mir alles verhaßt was mich blos belehrt, ohne meine 
Thätigkeit zu vermehren oder unmittelbar zu beleben” (Goethe in a 
letter to Schiller on 19 December 1798. In: Goethe 1987, vol. 106, 346). 
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Wilhelm F ink
A history of cultural knowledge is not congruent 
with a history of abstract concepts or rational ideas. 
As a consequence this essay presents a new and fas-
cinating cross-cultural approach for analysing the 
powers of literature and art to form aesthetic ideas 
of lasting cultural impact, for analysing the interre-
lation between the formative forces of the imagina-
tion and the form-giving material or medium. Its 
focus is on Figurations of Death and Figurations 
of Creativity. Both of these topics raise questions 
relevant to all cultures: how does innovation enter 
the world; how does a society come to terms with 
the deepest and most basic uncertainty of human 
existence, the awareness of mortality.
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